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Abstract 
On the 27th of February 2008, the German Federal Constitutional Court 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht) recognised in a landmark ruling for the first time a new 
constitutional right in the confidentiality and integrity of information technology 
systems. We will show in this case commentary why the Court found it necessary to 
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On the 27th of February 2008, the German Federal Constitutional Court 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht)1 recognised in a landmark ruling for the first time a new 
constitutional right in the confidentiality and integrity of information technology 
systems.2 The primary question the Court had to decide was the constitutionality of a 
law authorising the secret services of North Rhine-Westphalia to surreptitiously 
monitor and investigate the Internet. In particular, the law would have granted the 
secret services the right to clandestinely intercept and search for communication via 
the Internet, and to secretly access its information technology systems. This law had 
been introduced as an amendment to Art 5.2 no. 11 of the Act on the Protection of the 
Constitution in North Rhine-Westphalia (Gesetz über den Verfassungsschutz in 
Nordrhein-Westfalen) from 20 December 2006.  
The Court held in its judgement that such investigative actions do indeed interfere 
with constitutionally guaranteed rights. Any legislation permitting such actions 
therefore must be able to demonstrate that such an interference is justified by the 
protection of other constitutional rights, necessary to achieve this protection and 
proportionate in its impact. The Court found that the legislation as drafted was not in 
accordance with the Constitution, and therefore unlawful.3  
It had been widely anticipated that the Court would rule the amendment 
unconstitutional.4 The preliminary hearing before the Constitutional Court had also 
suggested this outcome.5 However, the reasoning of the Court and the scope of the 
decision came as a surprise to most observers. Most had expected that the Court 
would merely extend its comprehensive jurisprudence on search and seizure 
requirements for physical premises to the online environment. Instead, the Court 
created in its decision a new fundamental right, which explicitly protects privacy and 
personality rights of citizens in information and communication technology (ICT).  
2. Background of the Case 
The subject of the decision was the amendment of § 5.2 of the Act on the Protection 
of the Constitution in North Rhine-Westphalia from 20 December 2006. However, the 
amendment of this law was only one aspect in a discussion at federal level about the 
legality of a new type of investigation methods, the remote searching of computers 
and laptops. It is therefore necessary to give an account of this preceding debate. 
The public and legal debate on this subject was triggered in 2006 by the application of 
a state prosecutor to the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof, BGH). 
                                               
1
 Hereafter “the Court”. 
2




 See e.g. G Hornung, “ Ein neues Grundrecht. Der verfassungsrechtliche Schutz der "Vertraulichkeit 
und Integrität informationstechnischer Systeme"”, (2008) 5 Computer und Recht, 299. 
5
 M Kutscha, “Mehr Schutz von Computerdaten durch ein neues Grundrecht?”, (2008) 15 Neue 
Juristische Wochenschrift, 1042-1044. 
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In this application, he asked for a warrant to search remotely a suspect’s computer in a 
terrorism investigation, by covertly installing a surveillance programme similar to a 
Trojan. The application was rejected on the 25 November 2006. The state prosecutor 
appealed, claiming that Articles 1026, 1107 and 948 of the Criminal Code 
(Strafprozessordnung- StPO) allowed for such a search. His argument assumed a 
substantial similarity between the physical search of premises, regulated in these 
articles, and the remote access of a suspect’s computer. The BGH disagreed, rejecting 
in its judgement the analogy between a traditional search of physical premises and 
clandestine searches of a computer.9 However, the decision  mainly addressed formal 
procedural questions, ruling that without explicit legislation, granting such a warrant 
request would be ultra vires. The ruling left open the possibility that appropriate 
legislation could be introduced to create such new search and seizure powers, and it 
avoided any substantive decision as to the potential conflict such a law could create 
with fundamental constitutional guarantees. The State of North Rhine-Westphalia, by 
amending its existing law for the protection of the constitution, created just such a 
legal power.  
The Act on the Protection of the Constitution in North Rhine-Westphalia outlines the 
rights of, and establishes a legal basis for operations by, the Constitution Protection 
Agency, Germany’s main secret service for internal affairs.  Article 5.2 of this Act 
defines permissible actions to acquire information and private data from suspects. The 
amendment in question, of Article 5.2(11) of the North Rhine-Westphalia 
Constitution Protection Act, empowered the Constitution Protection Agency to carry 
out two types of investigative measures: Firstly, secret monitoring and other 
reconnaissance of the Internet (alternative 1), and secondly secret access to 
information technology systems (alternative 2). Secret monitoring of the Internet is a 
measure by which the Constitution Protection Agency obtains information about the 
content of Internet communication using the communication technology in the way it 
was intended to be used. These can be measures such as accessing an open website, 
participation in chats or online fora, but also accessing an email inbox or accessing  
restricted websites using a password obtained elsewhere, for example from an 
informant.10 By contrast, the secret access to an information technology system is 
understood to be its technical infiltration, by taking advantage of the security 
loopholes of the target system, or by installing a spy program.11  
The method at the core of the decision, infiltration of a computer through technical 
means, also referred to as “online search”, “Federal Trojan”, or “remote searching”, is 
one specific form of such information gathering. This investigative method tries to 
accommodate the difficulties in investigations that emerge if criminal offenders, in 
                                               
6
 Regulates the search of premises. 
7
 Regulates the seizure and search of documents and digital storage devices. 
8
 Regulates the securing and seizure of evidence. 
9
 BGH, NJW 2007, 930. 
10
 BVerfG, NJW 2008, 822 (825). 
11
 Ibid. 
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particular those from extremist and terrorist groups, use the Internet for 
communication and to plan and commit criminal offences.12 
The purpose of remotely searching a computer is to enable investigators to search the 
data stored on the hard disk and the working memory of the computer, to intercept the 
email traffic, and monitor web browsing habits and instant messaging.13 To 
accomplish this, a specifically designed computer program, a “remote forensic 
software” (RFS) tool, is planted on the suspect’s computer without his knowledge. 
This program is then able to copy all data stored on the computer and subsequently 
transfer it back to the investigating authority for evaluation. Such a program shares 
crucial features with well-known malware, in particular viruses and Trojans.14 The 
latter in particular can be used to access and extract personal data from targets, and 
hence is equally suitable for data collection by police authorities. This is why the RFS 
tool facilitating remote searches is often referred to as a “Federal Trojan” in Germany. 
The advantage of using these technologies is that they can be installed clandestinely, 
and without access to the suspect’s house or physical premises. They are designed to 
be disguised as something harmless, when they actually include malicious or harmful 
code, and therefore trick the suspect into installing them. Therefore, as with their 
criminal counterparts, police Trojans require the unwitting cooperation of the target.15 
This can happen through opening an email, for instance an email that purports to 
come from a bona fide state agency such as the local council or the Department for 
Pensions.  
If the infiltration is successful this method offers considerable advantages to the 
investigation authority in comparison to traditional investigation methods. Because 
the method is undertaken without the knowledge of the suspect, this person is not 
alerted to the fact that the police considers him a target, as opposed to a traditional 
house search. Furthermore, it allows collecting encrypted data in an unencrypted form 
as the investigating authority can access the data while the user is typing it. Moreover, 
passwords and further information on the usage pattern of the suspect can be 
collected. This kind of information would hardly ever be possible to obtain using 
traditional investigation methods.16 
A constitutional complaint is only admissible under German law if the complainant 
can show that he is directly affected by the state act, and that one of the fundamental 
rights enumerated in the first part of the Constitution is violated. The amendment of § 
5.2 of the Act on the Protection of the Constitution in North Rhine-Westphalia limits 
the applicability of this norm to illegal activities “threatening the free democratic 
fundamental order or the continued existence or the security of the Federation or of a 
Federal state”17, and during the discussion about the introduction of the online search 
as an investigative measure at federal level it was established that this should only be 
                                               
12
 BVerfG, NJW 2008, 822 (826). 
13
 K Leipold, “Die Online-Durchsuchung”, (2007) 4 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift Spezial 135. 
14
 U Buermeyer, “Die ‘Online-Durchsuchung’ – Technischer Hintergrund des verdeckten hoheitlichen 




 BVerfG, NJW 2008, 822 (826). 
17
 § 3.1 Verfassungsschutzgesetz Nordrhein-Westfalen.  
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used to investigate suspects in terrorist investigations or comparably severe cases. 
Nevertheless, the four claimants filing a constitutional complaint against the 
amendment of § 5.2 of the Act on the Protection of the Constitution in North Rhine-
Westphalia claimed that this law constituted a direct violation of their constitutional   
rights, even though none of them had been suspects in a criminal investigation.  The 
Court accepted this view and admitted the constitutional complaints. The four 
claimants could all show that, although not involved in any illegal behaviour 
themselves, their professional activity might wrongly be classified as such and may 
cause the remote searching of their computers under the new amendment, thereby 
violating their rights guaranteed by the constitution.  One claimant was a journalist 
accessing Internet sites operated by persons with extremist views and connections to 
extremist organisations, and participating in chats hosted on these websites, while also 
using the computer for private purposes.  Another claimant was a member of a 
political party under observation by the North Rhine-Westphalian Constitution 
Protection Authority, who was using the computer for both work and private 
purposes.  A further claimant was a lawyer assisting asylum-seekers, some of whom 
are under observation by the North Rhine-Westphalian constitution protection 
authority, while using the computer for work and private purposes. 
Having passed the first formal hurdle and having been accepted for a substantive 
decision, the Court now had to determine whether (a) § 5.2 of the Act on the 
Protection of the Constitution in North Rhine-Westphalia was constitutional, and (b) 
was invited to consider more generally the constitutionality of this type of 
investigative methods.  
3. The Decision 
The Court ruled that § 5.2 of the Act on the Protection of the Constitution in North 
Rhine-Westphalia was not in compliance with the constitution and therefore null and 
void. As indicated above, this result did not come as a surprise. However, the 
expectation had been that the Court would only need to apply the explicitly 
enumerated basic rights and constitutional principles to reach this conclusion. The 
Court however found that for several reasons the existing rights canon was not 
sufficient to protect the constitutional rights of citizens from the potential loss of 
liberty that the remote searching of computers could cause, and thus created – or 
maybe inferred from first principles – a new basic right in the confidentiality and 
integrity of information technology systems. 
This surprise move was partly due to the welcome fact that the court engaged in 
considerable depth with the specific technological issues that the legislation raised. 
Three of the countries leading academics in the field, Prof Felix Freiling, Chair of 
Computer Science at the University Mannheim, Prof. Dr. Andreas Pfitzmann, head of 
the privacy and security group at Dresden University of Technology and Prof. Dr. Dr. 
hc Ulrich Sieber, director at the Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International 
Criminal Law were appointed by the court as technical experts. Maybe more unusual 
was the background of a fourth expert advising the court. Andreas Bogk is a freelance 
Hacker at Clozure Inc and CEO at Chaos Computer Club Events, one of the biggest 
and most influential hacker organizations. Their academic and practical expertise was 
fully matched by the court, whose judges with only one exception all were previous 
holders of senior academic positions.  
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3.1 The Respondents 
The Land (regional) Government of North Rhine-Westphalia (having introduced the 
new investigative power) and the Federal Government (as a discussant to the Court on 
this matter, anticipating a similar issue arising in the future for the federal agencies) 
accepted from the beginning that strict constitutional scrutiny of the new measure was 
necessary. However, they also argued that RFS tools were sufficiently similar to 
existing police powers in the offline world that analogous application of the relevant 
constitutional norms was sufficient. The Land submitted in addition that its law as 
drafted was compliant with the relevant provision from the constitution. Despite this 
united front on the principle, the two respondents identified different constitutional 
norms as “closest off-line match”. The Land Government identified the constitutional 
right guaranteeing the privacy of telecommunications in Article 10.1 of the German 
Basic Law (Gundgesetz – GG) as applicable law. It argued that remote online search 
was essentially a new form of wiretapping, and its proposed legislation extended the 
safeguards in place for wiretapping operations to the new technology. The Federal 
Government by contrast argued that such investigative measures would best be 
covered by the fundamental guarantee to the inviolability of the home in Article 13 
GG, seeing the online search as the equivalent to the physical search of a suspect’s 
home.  
While there was disagreement about the appropriate legal classification of the process 
of remote online searches, both parties were in agreement regarding the regulation of 
the outcome of such a search. They conceded that the right to informational self-
determination as derived from Article 2.1 GG in connection with Article 1.1 GG 
could serve as a standard for an online search. The legal argument mirrored in this 
respect an earlier landmark decision of the Constitutional Court that had shaped 
Germany’s data protection law in the past.  
From the position of the state and the investigative authorities, this strategy made 
sense. They could have argued that the new technology was so different from existing 
police powers that none of the constitutional norms applied, and only non 
constitutional law such as criminal law provisions against hacking needed 
amendment. However, this would have been a high risk strategy with little chance of 
success. Too obvious was the highly intrusive nature of the remote forensic software 
(RFS) technology, and too obvious its similarities to constitutionally sensitive forms 
of surveillance to even attempt to treat it as a mere police procedural issue. By 
conceding the main point, the state was able to choose its battlefield and design the 
relevant legislation in such a way that the demands of constitutional compliance did 
not disrupt police efficiency. The consequences of both articles for police procedure 
and investigative practice are well understood, and a considerable case law creates a 
high degree of legal certainty. Since violation of the constitution can result in the 
inadmissibility of otherwise reliable evidence, this degree of certainty is highly 
desirable for police practice. A more cynical view would be that over the last decades, 
police and secret services have learned how to abide by the spirit of these provisions, 
while working creatively around the restrictions. The codes regulating police 
procedure and criminal investigation, most importantly the Criminal Procedure Act 
(Strafprozessordnung StPO) provides the necessary procedure and safeguards that 
concretise the protective norms of the constitution. The procedural hurdles and 
requirements that the police have to observe, for instance the warrant requirements, 
differ in detail between wiretapping and search of premises. Why Federal and State 
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Government expressed different preferences is not obvious. Broadly speaking, the 
position of the Regional Government was more aggressive, the position of the Federal 
Government more restrained, since the protection against physical searches is 
generally more rigorous than that of wiretapping operations. Conceptually, the two 
approaches betray a different understanding of the nature of the Internet. The Land 
took a conservative approach that reduces the experience of the Internet to what it 
technically is, telecommunication similar to making a phone call. The Federal 
Government by contrast indicated a willingness to take the user experience and the 
user understanding of information systems serious, and conceptualised at least certain 
forms of computer and Internet use not just as an essentially trivial activity rooted in 
the physical world, but as creating its own, digital world that deserves being taken 
seriously. Our “home” is partly online, and therefore rules protecting our physical 
homes should also apply to our digital habitats.  
In the next section, we will analyse how the Court responded to these submissions. 
3.2 Article 10.1 Grundgesetz – The Secrecy of Telecommunications 
The right to the secrecy of telecommunications according to Article 10.1 GG protects 
the non-physical transmission of information to individual recipients with the aid of 
telecommunications devices:18  
(1) The privacy of correspondence, posts and telecommunications 
shall be inviolable. 
(2) Restrictions may be ordered only pursuant to a law. If the 
restriction serves to protect the free democratic basic order or the 
existence or security of the Federation or of a Land, the law may 
provide that the person affected shall not be informed of the 
restriction and that recourse to the courts shall be replaced by a 
review of the case by agencies and auxiliary agencies appointed by 
the legislature.    
The protection of this fundamental right covers any type of telecommunication 
regardless of the transmission type used (cable or broadcast, analogue or digital 
transmission), and the data transmitted (speech, picture, sound, or other data). The 
scope of protection of the secrecy of telecommunications therefore also includes any 
communication via the internet.19 Furthermore, protected by this right are not only the 
contents of the communication, but also details about their general circumstances, 
such as details about the communication partners, and the transmission type (by 
email, chat, VoIP).20 Particularly important for online contexts, metadata generated as 
a result of communication had been included into the scope of the article by the courts 
in previous decisions. The Court therefore affirmed that any ongoing communication 
via the internet, and the data generated by such communication falls within the scope 
of the protection of Article 10.1 GG. Hence, every investigation method targeting 
                                               
18
 See e.g. BVerfGE 67, 157 (172); 106, 28 (35). 
19
 See BVerfGE 113, 348 (383) for emails. 
20
 See e.g. BVerfGE 67, 157 (172); 85, 386 (396). 
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ongoing communication and the data related to it has to be in compliance with the 
right to the secrecy of telecommunications as laid down in Article 10.1 GG. The 
scope of protection of this fundamental right is affected regardless of whether the 
measure targets the transmission channel or the terminal used for 
telecommunication.21  
As seen above, Art 10(2) GG permits the interception of communication under certain 
conditions, and the Land Government of North Rhine-Westphalia stated that the 
amendment of § 5.2 of the Act on the Protection of the Constitution in North Rhine-
Westphalia meets the constitutional requirements as to the justification of the 
encroachment.22 Procedurally, a law is required that creates the relevant police 
powers. Substantially, any law that violates prima facie a constitutional right has to 
have as its aim the protection of another right listed in the constitution, the violation 
of the right has to be necessary to achieve the intended goal and the violation must be 
proportionate to protection that is gained.23 How the legislation achieves this 
balancing act is however largely left to Parliament. Having for instance a requirement 
for judicial warrants in such legislation will help it to pass the constitutionality test, 
but is not a direct constitutional requirement. Conceptualising online surveillance 
through Trojans as interception of communication was the view proposed by the 
North Rhine-Westphalian Government and the police forces, based on the notion that 
the Trojan itself can only function when there is an active communication connection, 
that is when the computer is connected to the internet and data is transmitted. .  
The Court only agreed in parts with this analysis. It found in particular that Article 
10.1 GG does not protect telecommunication data that is stored on ICT devices after 
the communication process is completed, especially if the data is not in the public 
domain and the affected person has undertaken steps to protect the data from 
unauthorised access.24 Furthermore, the Court stated that the protection of Article 10.1 
GG does equally not apply if a state agency monitors the use of an information 
technology system as such, or searches the storage media of the system. This is also 
the case if a telecommunication connection is used for transmission of the data 
collected to the evaluating authority, as is the case for instance with searching of 
computers online.25 In our opinion, this analysis is correct. That the Trojan requires 
that the suspect is at some point online and engaged in communication does not make 
the search a wiretapping operation any more than a police officer who seizes a 
suspects phone during a physical search of his premises changes the nature of the 
operation from a search into an interception of telecommunication.    
The secret infiltration of a complex information technology system offers the 
opportunity to spy on the system as a whole, and is not just an intercept of an isolated 
exchange of communication as in a traditional wiretapping operation.26 In particular, 
                                               
21
 BVerfGE 106, 28 (37-38); 107, 299 (312-313). 
22
 BVerfG, NJW 2008, 822 (841). 
23
 BVerfGE 35, 202 “Lebach decision”. 
24
 BVerfG, NJW 2008, 822 (842). 
25
 J Rux, “Ausforschung privater Rechner durch die Polizei- und Sicherheitsbehörden”, (2007) 62 (6) 
JuristenZeitung, 285. 
26
 BVerG, NJW 2008, 822 (842). 
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there is a chance that personal data stored on the computer, which is unrelated to and 
goes over and above the contents and circumstances of the ongoing 
telecommunication, is collected (even if this is unintended). Thus, the potential threat 
to civil liberties goes far beyond the mere surveillance of telecommunication, and also 
beyond the protective scope of Article 10.1 GG. 
The Court therefore came to the conclusion that Article 10.1 GG can only provide 
sufficient protection against the infiltration of an information technology system if the 
surveillance is restricted exclusively to data emanating from an ongoing 
telecommunication process.27 If the infiltration serves to collect data over and above 
telecommunications, e.g. by copying data from the hard drive, Article 10.1 GG is not 
on point. In practice, this means that hardly any search will be a “pure” 
communications intercept. The main aim of the RFS tool as discussed above is to 
collect data stored on a computer, and the conceptual gap to communication 
interception is too wide to be bridged by analogous interpretation of Article 10.1. This 
also means that several aspects of the remote searching of computers are not covered 
by the guarantee of secrecy in telecommunications as provided by Article 10.1GG.   
3.3 Article 13.1 Grundgesetz – The Inviolability of the Home 
The guarantee of the inviolability of the home granted by Article 13.1 GG protects the 
private living space from intrusion by the state:  
(1) The home is inviolable. 
This guarantees an essential space to the individual as a necessary precondition for 
personal dignity, as well as in the interest of the development of ones personality. 
This guarantee may only be encroached upon under special preconditions as outlined 
in Article 13.2 to 13.7 GG: 
2) Searches may be authorized only by a judge or, when time is of 
the essence, by other authorities designated by the laws, and may be 
carried out only in the manner therein prescribed. 
(3) If particular facts justify the suspicion that any person has 
committed an especially serious crime specifically defined by a law, 
technical means of acoustical surveillance of any home in which the 
suspect is supposedly staying may be employed pursuant to judicial 
order for the purpose of prosecuting the offense, provided that 
alternative methods of investigating the matter would be 
disproportionately difficult or unproductive. The authorization shall 
be for a limited time. The order shall be issued by a panel composed 
of three judges. When time is of the essence, it may also be issued by 
a single judge. 
(4) To avert acute dangers to public safety, especially dangers to 
life or to the public, technical means of surveillance of the home 
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 However, this is technically currently still impossible to ensure (See note 4, at 299). 
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may be employed only pursuant to judicial order. When time is of 
the essence, such measures may also be ordered by other authorities 
designated by a law; a judicial decision shall subsequently be 
obtained without delay. 
(5) If technical means are contemplated solely for the protection of 
persons officially deployed in a home, the measure may be ordered 
by an authority designated by a law. The information thereby 
obtained may be otherwise used only for purposes of criminal 
prosecution or to avert danger and only if the legality of the 
measure has been previously determined by a judge; when time is of 
the essence, a judicial decision shall subsequently be obtained 
without delay. 
(6) The Federal Government shall report to the Bundestag annually 
as to the employment of technical means pursuant to paragraph (3) 
and, within the jurisdiction of the Federation, pursuant to 
paragraph (4) and, insofar as judicial approval is required, 
pursuant to paragraph (5) of this Article. A panel elected by the 
Bundestag shall exercise parliamentary control on the basis of this 
report. A comparable parliamentary control shall be afforded by the 
Länder. 
(7) Interferences and restrictions shall otherwise only be 
permissible to avert a danger to the public or to the life of an 
individual, or, pursuant to a law, to confront an acute danger to 
public safety and order, in particular to relieve a housing shortage, 
to combat the danger of an epidemic, or to protect young persons at 
risk. 
The spatial sphere in which private life takes place constitutes the interests protected 
by this fundamental right.28 The private living space is, however, not limited to the 
private flat or house of the rights holder, but also includes business and office space.29 
It protects this space from physical intrusion, as well as from the use of technical 
measures that provide an insight into the otherwise protected happenings inside the 
private living space. This is, for example, the acoustic and optical surveillance of a 
living space,30 but also the measurement of electromagnetic radiation to monitor the 
use of information technology systems inside the dwelling.  
The Federal Government argued that the online search of computers can be compared 
to the search of a house, and Article 13 GG can therefore be used as a standard for 
such measures. As we have seen, unlike the previous provision, Article 13 contains 
directly and explicitly non-negotiable conditions for any prima facie infringement. 
This means that the state is considerably more limited in adjusting the relevant 
procedural law to accommodate the new technology. While there is no formal ranking 
                                               
28
 See BVerfGE 89, 1 (12); 103, 142 (150-151). 
29
 BVerfGE 32, 54 (69). 
30
 BVerfGE 109, 279 (309, 327). 
(2009) 6:1 SCRIPTed 
 
116
between different constitutional rights, the greater care that the drafters used to 
specify in some details the non-negotiable core of Article 13 in comparison to Article 
10 indicates just how serious any interference with the physical space is considered.   
Consequently, the Federal Government conceded that the high ”intensity” of the 
encroachment on civil liberties that any restriction of Article 13 brings also means 
that such a measure should only ever be the ultima ratio for a (federal or state) 
Constitution Protection Agency. 
As with its analysis of Article 10, the Court agreed in parts and rejected the analysis 
in parts. It found that Article 13.1 GG could only provide protection of the private 
living space against the secret intrusion by police or secret service to physically 
manipulate information technology systems, and against the infiltration of such 
systems to monitor the events in a flat using peripherals connected to the system (such 
as the use of inbuilt microphones for eavesdropping).31  
It stated that such actions would be comparable in its nature to the traditional search 
of a house and would therefore be covered by Article 13 GG. However, even this 
protection did not go far enough, and it underestimates the importance of the digital 
world for today’s citizens. The Court argued that Article 13 GG is insufficient to 
protect rights holders against the general infiltration of information technology 
systems using a Trojan or similar software to access the stored data and monitor the 
communication, even if the system is located in a dwelling.32 One specific problem 
created by RFS searches is that infiltration and monitoring can be performed 
regardless of the location of the information technology system. Hence, a location-
dependent protection is useless if the system is located outside the private space, or on 
the move between “protected” areas. Especially small information technology devices 
such as laptops, PDAs and mobile phones are designed to be carried around. The 
precise location of the system will often even be unknown, and is also irrelevant for 
investigators when infiltrating the device to access stored data. This would have had 
the counterintuitive consequence that a citizen who starts writing an email on his 
laptop at home, reviews it on a park bench and completes and sends it back at home 
moves between protected and unprotected environments, loosing and gaining 
apparently arbitrarily constitutional protection, and this creating artificial distinctions 
in an activity that is experienced as uniform by the citizen.  
3.4 Article 2.1 Grundgesetz in Conjunction with 1.1 Grundgesetz – The Right to 
Information Self-determination 
Having analysed and rejected as insufficient both Article 10 and Article 13, the Court 
developed its own answer. It started its analysis by the now commonplace insight that 
due to recent technological developments, information technology devices are 
omnipresent in today’s societies and their use is of considerable importance to many 
citizens.33 This applies first and foremost to personal computers, but as the Court 
points out, the relevance of information technology devices is not limited to personal 
                                               
31
 BVerfG, NJW 2008, 822 (843). 
32
 M Gercke, “Heimliche Online-Durchsuchung: Anspruch und Wirklichkeit; der Einsatz 
softwarebasierter Ermittlungsinstrumente zum heimlichen Zugriff auf Computerdaten”, (2007) 23 (4) 
Computer und Recht, 245 (250). 
33
 BVerfG, NJW 2008, 822 (841). 
(2009) 6:1 SCRIPTed 
 
117
computers only. It recognised that many items that are used on an everyday basis by 
large sections of the German population include elements of information 
technology.34 Mobile phones, BlackBerries and even MP3 players are prominent 
examples for such frequently used devices, intelligent fridges, toasters and even 
jewellery are already appearing on the horizon as next extensions. Furthermore, the 
Court recognised that the cultural and social significance of such devices and of 
personal computers in particular has increased significantly, as they can be used for a 
large number of different purposes, such as comprehensive administration and 
archiving of an individual’s private and business matters, or in one of the many 
entertainment applications for leisure activities.35 Thus the data stored on information 
technology devices provides comprehensive information about the personal 
circumstances, social contacts, personal preferences and activities of the user. 
The Court argued that for most people, the use of the Internet is an essential part of 
the way they live their lives, and an important aspect of the way in which they 
develop and express their personality. It also stated that in addition to the new 
potential for the development of one’s personality, the increasing spread of and 
reliance on networked information technology devices also creates new dangers for 
the personal development of individuals. In addition to the potentially sensitive data 
stored on the devices themselves, the user of a device connected to the Internet will 
(knowingly and unknowingly) leave data and information related to his personality 
and user behaviour with intermediaries and on other servers behind. Knowledge about 
every single piece of such data can be harmless, but, as the Court argued, the 
combination of the data stored on information technology devices and held by other 
entities in a network can make it possible to form a profile if a third party collects and 
evaluates it.36 Above all, however, the networking of the system opens to third parties 
a technical access facility, which can be used to spy on or manipulate data kept on the 
system. The individual cannot detect such access at all in some cases, or at least can 
only prevent it to a limited degree.37  
It is the combination of the changing social and cultural significance of the use of 
information technology devices for the development of one’s personality combined 
with the recognition of new, equally technologically enabled threats to the free 
development of one’s personality through e.g. new data mining capacities, that led the 
court to recognise the fundamental importance of solidifying constitutional guaranties 
in online settings.  
In the year when the first TCP/IP-based wide-area network was operational and all 
hosts on the ARPANET were switched over from the older NCP protocols, and five 
years before the Internet had been opened to commercial providers, the Constitutional 
Court had in a landmark ruling unrelated to ICT created the core of Germany’s data 
protection law.38 The right to information self-determination, which is not explicitly 
mentioned in the constitution, was derived from Article 2.1 in conjunction with 
Article 1.1 GG, which guarantee the right to free development of one’s personality 
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and a general  “right to dignity”, respectively. Ruling on the constitutionality of the 
national census, it establishes a legal entitlement to the capacity of the individual to 
determine in principle the disclosure and use of one’s personal data.39 This right 
resulted from the court’s recognition that the state had multiple possibilities to collect 
process and use private data, and that the evolution of electronic data processing 
techniques had simplified these to such an extent that a detailed image of the 
personality of the individual became feasible. This had the potential to impair 
confidentiality interests of the affected person, which are protected by fundamental 
rights. Moreover, the mere anticipation that one’s data could be collected entailed an 
unacceptable encroachment on one’s freedom of conduct, encouraging people to 
forgo valid, and perfectly legal, lifestyle choices in the mere anticipation that 
information about them could be collected and leaked to third parties. This means in 
particular that no concrete threat has to be evident. The Court stated that this is in 
particular the case if personal data can be used and linked in a manner, which the 
person concerned can neither detect nor prevent.40 Fear of surveillance is just as 
limiting to the free development of a social personality as the surveillance itself.  
Both, the Land Government of North Rhine-Westphalia and the Federal Government 
conceded that the right to information self-determination should be a fundamental 
right standard for online searches, but argued also that it is sufficient to regulate such 
investigative measures.  
However, the Court found that the right to information self-determination does not 
sufficiently appreciated the fact that individuals rely on information technology 
systems to develop their personality and hence entrust the system with sensitive data, 
or inevitably provide such data by merely using the system.41 A third party accessing 
such a system can obtain potentially large amounts of sensible information about an 
individual, without having to rely on further data collection and processing measures. 
In a way, on could say that these measures cut out the middle man. The data comes 
already preprocessed and arranged by the data subject. Since the older data protection 
decision focused on the process of data handling and organization, it was in danger of 
being circumvented by the new surveillance technology. The active, if unwitting, 
participation of the suspect that is crucial for the functioning of the RFS had therefore 
also the potential to deprive the suspect of otherwise taken for granted protection.  
Online searching of a computer is of a severity for the personality of the affected 
person that goes beyond mere individual data collection, against which the right to 
information self-determination provides protection, and is therefore not covered by 
this fundamental right. 
4. The Right in the Confidentiality and Integrity of Information 
Technology Systems  
Having determined that existing rights are not sufficient to protect citizens from the 
threat against their personality rights, the Court established a new fundamental right 
                                               
39
 BVerfGE 65, 1 (43); 84, 192 (194). 
40
 BVerfG, NJW 2008, 822 (844). 
41
 Ibid. 
(2009) 6:1 SCRIPTed 
 
119
in the confidentiality and integrity of information technology systems to close the 
regulatory gap. 
Just like the fundamental right in information self-determination, this right is not 
explicitly mentioned in the constitution. Although it does not happen very often in 
Germany that a new basic right is established through judicial activism, the right of 
the Court to creatively fill identified gaps in the constitution’s civil rights framework 
is widely recognised and, unlike in the US, originalism has never been a prominent 
position in post-war Germany.42 
In the same way as the right in information self-determination, this new fundamental 
right is based on Article 2.1 GG in conjunction with Article 1.1 GG, and is derived 
from a general personality right. Article 1 GG that states that “Human Dignity is 
inviolable, and all organs of the state have the ultimate aim to protect it” establishes a 
general overriding principle in the German legal system, and is designed explicitly as 
a stop-gap solution if legislative solutions fall behind social change. The new 
constitutional right in the confidentiality and integrity of information technology 
systems protects, so the Court, the personal and private life of rights holders from the 
state accessing information technology devices, and in particular against access by the 
state of  the information technology system as a whole, and not only of individual 
communication events or stored data.43 
4.1 Which Systems are protected? 
The Court applies the guarantees of this right to information technology systems, but 
interestingly in doing so does not deliver a definition of such a system. Instead, it lists 
systems that are not protected by this right, and provides a description of minimum 
abilities an information technology system must possess to fall into the protection 
scope of this fundamental right. By doing so, it keeps the protection scope of this 
basic right very broad and deliberately avoids tailoring this new basic right to specific 
technologies. It thereby clearly acknowledges the rapid technological developments of 
information technology devices, and attempts to create technology neutral legislation 
with this judgement, hence trying to keep the new basic right “future-proof”.44 
The Court finds that not all systems that are able to create, process or store personal 
data require special protection of a separate guarantee of personal rights.45 Systems 
that contain data pertaining to a certain aspect of the affected person’s life only are 
not protected by this new fundamental right. Such systems could, for example, be 
non-networked electronic control systems in household appliances.46 Clearly, access 
to such data would not enable authorities to gain a detailed insight into the personality 
of the person concerned.  
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The protective scope of the fundamental right in confidentiality and integrity of 
information technology system is applied to systems which alone, or in their technical 
interconnectedness, can contain personal data of the person concerned to such a 
degree and in such a diversity that access to the system facilitates insight into 
significant parts of the life of a person or indeed provides a revealing picture of their 
personality.47 Such systems are for example personal computers and laptops (used for 
both private and business purposes), and mobile phones and electronic calendars, 
which have a large number of functions and can collect and store many kinds of 
personal data. Interestingly, the Court decided that the mere ability of the system to 
store personal data is sufficient. Whether this capacity was utilised by the user in 
question need not be determined in the individual case. This means that this right 
protects a system, such as a computer, even if it does not actually contain sensitive 
personal data, as long as it is technically able to store and process such information. 
Furthermore, it acknowledges that systems that are part of a network (such as the 
Internet) do not always contain personal data themselves, but data about the person 
concerned can be stored on another system within the network, which however can be 
accessible if the system is infiltrated. This new fundamental right thus is to apply to 
data that is outsourced, for example using cloud computing technology.48 This makes 
the decision also the first that explicitly recognised the pertinent legal issues that 
cloud computing and its diffuse ownership and control arrangement will inevitably 
bring. 
4.2 What is protected? 
What precisely does the basic right in integrity and confidentiality of information 
technology systems protect? Firstly, it protects the interest of a user of an information 
technology system in ensuring that the data created, processed and stored by the 
system remains confidential.49 Secondly, this right is violated if the integrity of such a 
system is affected by the system being accessed in such a way that third parties can 
use its performance, functions and storage contents. This would mean, as the Court 
establishes, that the most crucial technical hurdle to enable the spying, surveillance or 
manipulation of the system would be overcome.50  
The Court specifies further that this basic right protects the right holder in particular 
from the clandestine access of an information technology system that is targeted at the 
system in its entirety or its major parts. The scope of protection of this right covers 
both the data kept on the working memory as well as data which is temporarily or 
permanently kept on the storage media of the system. It also protects against data 
acquisition that does not rely on the data processing procedures of the system itself, 
but nevertheless targets these, such as so-called key-loggers, which monitor the 
keystrokes of a user to gain passwords and other crucial login details.51 
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The Court further states that the protection arising from this fundamental right does 
not depend on the degree of difficulty in accessing the system. The Court therefore 
acknowledges that users of information technology systems have a varying 
knowledge of technical means to protect systems from being infiltrated by third 
parties, and does not grant users with a better knowledge a higher degree of 
protection.  
However, a protection only exists if the person concerned considers the system his 
own, and thus may presume that he alone or others authorised by him, such as close 
family members, use it in a self-determined manner. Using a public access 
information technology system in a rail station that provides timetable and travel 
information is therefore not covered. Covered however is also the use of one’s own 
system via the use of information technology systems that are at the disposal of 
others. This could, for example, be the remote access of one’s system or external 
storage device via a computer in a cyber café.  
4.3 Restrictions 
However, the right in the confidentiality and integrity of information technology 
systems is not absolute. It can be restricted for both preventive purposes and to 
prosecute crimes. Yet, any measure that restricts this fundamental right has to be 
proportionate to the violation, especially if the measure is carried out without the 
knowledge of the suspect. Hence, the Court has found that a measure restricting this 
right is only proportionate where sufficient evidence exists that significant higher-
ranking fundamental values need to be protected. Higher-ranking fundamental values 
are the life and integrity of other citizens, the foundations of the state, and essential 
values of humanity.52 However, the Court then softens this requirement, ruling that a 
high level of probability that the danger will materialise in the near future is not 
required.53 
Furthermore, any such measure has to be scrutinised and confirmed by a judge on a 
case-by-case basis to guarantee an objective and independent control prior to the 
execution, and it has to be based on a constitutional legal basis.54  
A further requirement is that any measure restricting the right in the confidentiality 
and integrity of information technology systems does not violate the core area of the 
private conduct of life, which includes among other things communication and 
information about inner feelings or deep relationships. The private conduct of life is 
an absolute fundamental right, which cannot be restricted (Article 1.1 GG – right to 
human dignity). Since it will often be very difficult to differentiate between core area 
and non-core area data during the investigation process, the Court states that adequate 
procedures have to be in place for the examination stage of the data. In particular, if 
core area data is detected, this data has to be deleted immediately and the use of this 
data by the state is prohibited.55 However, this raises the dilemma that the requirement 
to delete the collected core area data cannot undo the violation of the absolute right to 
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human dignity. Furthermore, as Kutscha points out, although the measure itself has to 
be permitted by a judge, the Court has not established a requirement for a judge to 
control the analysis process.56 
5. Conclusion  
The reasoning of the Court has been, from a technology or technologically aware 
perspective, exceptionally well-grounded, thereby gainsaying frequent criticism that 
legal responses are formed by people ignorant of the relevant technology. 
Furthermore, the newly developed fundamental right is drafted broadly enough to 
sufficiently deal with future technological developments.  
While the main impetus of the ruling was to increase protection of citizens, the Court 
has also established that remote online searching of computers is not generally an 
unconstitutional measure, but that legislation allowing for this will have to be in strict 
compliance with the right in the confidentiality and integrity of information 
technology systems in addition to the already established protection of Articles 10 GG 
and 13 GG. One the one hand, this means that the Court has paved the way for 
Germany to act on the recommendation of the Council of the European Union that 
Member States should facilitate the clandestine search of computers of suspects to 
combat cybercrime.57 At the same time, it has established high procedural hurdles for 
the use of this technology. An issue that cannot be discussed in this paper is the 
potential border conflicts that the technology can bring with it, if a RFS migrates on a 
server outside the jurisdiction of the investigating police, or if a suspects physically 
carries an “infected” device abroad.58 Since the protection of Article 1 covers also 
foreign nationals on German territory, potential for conflict is therefore high if other 
member states decide to introduce the technology with comparatively lower 
safeguards 
By creating the new fundamental right in the confidentiality and integrity of 
information technology systems the Court has, for the first time, recognised that 
information technology not only plays an important role in people’s life as an add-on 
or extension to live in the physical world, but also that an increasing number of people 
“live” online. The Internet has become a living space, where people make friends, 
form societies and exchange information, and the Court has acknowledged that 
existing legislation is insufficient to adequately protect citizens from state violations 
of this digital environment. The “digital citizen” has, as a result of this case, come a 
step closer. By the same token, it is not inconceivable that the Court will in the future 
expand this concept also in the opposite direction. At present, the Federal Trojan is 
understood as a digital tool used by real, physical police officers. But if the Court 
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takes its own reasoning serious, it could as well consider the Trojan itself as a digital 
police officer, subject to the same restrictions but also powers that its physical 
counterparts posses. The future is likely to see new attempts by regional and federal 
Governments in Germany to create “constitution proof” procedural laws that precede 
the precise legal foundation required by the Court. We are likely to see challenges 
against these redrafted laws following suit, giving the Court more opportunity to flesh 
out the new right into the confidentiality and integrity of information technology 
systems. In particular the “third party effect” of the ruling has yet to be determined, 
and the degree in which employers, ISPs and content providers such as Google will 
also be considered potential infringers of this new right. The UK Phorm saga for 
instance seems like an ideal application of the new right to private sector actors. This 
will also require rethinking the precise relation between the new right and its older 
brother, the right in information self-determination. Information self-determination, as 
the name expresses, is primarily about the free choice of data subjects, including the 
choice to share his data. This element of choice is absent from the new right, casting 
even more doubts if the present practice of data handlers to ask for consent will be 
sufficient in the future.  
 
